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CONFRONTING THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM IN
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
JILL E. FISCH*
Many critics argue that private securities litigation fails effectively
either to deter corporate misconduct or to compensate defrauded investors.
In particular, commentators reason that damages reflect socially inefficient
transfer payments—the so-called circularity problem. Fox and Mitchell
address the circularity problem by identifying new reasons why private
litigation is an effective deterrent, focusing on the role of disclosure in
improving corporate governance.
The corporate governance rationale for securities regulation is more
powerful than the authors recognize. By collecting and using corporate
information in their trading decisions, informed investors play a critical role
in enhancing market efficiency. This efficiency, in turn, allows the capital
markets to discipline management, producing a governance externality that
improves corporate decision-making and benefits non-trading shareholders.
As this article shows, this governance externality justifies compensating
informed traders for their fraud-based trading losses.
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INTRODUCTION
Private securities litigation has become increasingly controversial.
The Republican Contract with America1 criticized securities-fraud
class-action lawsuits as abusive,2 and Congress responded to these
criticisms by enacting the extensive reforms of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).3 The reforms did not
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1.
REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1994), available at
www.house.gov/house/contract/CONTRACT.html.
2.
See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities
Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 535 (1997) (describing claims of abusive private
litigation).
3.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z–1).
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eliminate the controversy, however. Recent academic commentaries—
from scholars embracing a variety of political perspectives—raise
serious questions about the efficacy of the private right of action.4
Indeed, the academic literature reflects a general consensus that the
traditional justifications for private litigation are deficient, and that the
rationale for private litigation must be reconsidered.5
Professors Merritt Fox6 and Lawrence Mitchell7 have taken up this
challenge. The authors have written two papers that offer new
justifications for private litigation. In particular, both authors confront
and reject the claim that private securities litigation is socially wasteful
because it merely transfers funds from one set of shareholders to
another. Some scholars have characterized this transfer as the
“circularity problem.”8
Fox and Mitchell each confront the circularity problem by focusing
on the deterrent value of private litigation. Fox describes financial
transparency as a tool for facilitating shareholder monitoring, and views
private litigation as a means of making disclosure requirements
effective.9 Mitchell argues that shareholders are ultimately responsible
for managerial malfeasance, and that private litigation deters

4.
See, e.g., ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5 (2005), available at http://www.institute
forlegalreform.com/index.php?option=com_ilr_docs&issue_code=SLI&doc_type=ST
U (stating that large institutional investors are systematically overcompensated by
securities-fraud litigation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:
An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545–50
(2006) (arguing that private litigation fails to achieve either compensation or deterrence
objectives); Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223,
225–26 (2007) (identifying weaknesses in current litigation structure); Donald C.
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without

Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus
Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 650–52 (2007) (questioning
whether enterprise liability should be pared back to increase the deterrent value of
litigation).
5.
See sources cited supra note 4.
6.
Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When
Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 297.
7.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on
Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WISC. L. REV.
243.
8.
Professor Coffee appears to have coined this specific phrase. See Coffee,
supra note 4, at 1556. Professor Cox used similar terminology ten years earlier. See
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497,
509 (1997) (“A reason that the securities class action poorly serves both a
compensatory and a deterrent objective is the circuity problem that arises when the
source of a settlement is the corporation that commits the misrepresentation.”).
9.
See generally Fox, supra note 6.
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shareholder passivity or shirking.10 According to Mitchell, the need to
maintain shareholder accountability for monitoring failures undercuts
the argument that shareholders who pay fraud damages are “innocent
shareholders.”
Both papers reject the traditional divide between corporate
governance and securities regulation, placing private securities-fraud
litigation squarely within the realm of corporate governance. They do
this by privatizing securities litigation—characterizing its objectives as
the reduction of managerial agency costs and the improvement of
corporate decision making. Thus, the authors move away from a
conception of securities litigation in terms of investor protection, a
conception at the core of the traditional compensation rationale. Neither
Fox nor Mitchell seeks to protect investors who trade securities at
prices tainted by fraud, and neither author takes seriously the claim that
social harm is measured by the extent of that taint.
Yet in rejecting investor protection and its focus on compensation,
the authors overlook a critical component of their own corporategovernance story. Capital-market discipline through the efficient
incorporation and pricing of firm-specific information depends critically
upon the existence of informed trading. Investors who seek out
information, use that information to price securities, and then rely on
that information in their trading decisions inject the economic
significance of that information into the capital markets. Informed
investing improves the efficiency of the markets and enables them to
discipline managers.
But informed trading is expensive. Acquiring information is costly,
as is the reduced diversification necessary to reap the benefits of
reliance-based trading. Fraud-based losses add to these costs, which are
borne disproportionately by informed reliance-based traders. By
compensating traders for fraud-based losses, private civil liability
increases the incentive to engage in informed trading. This trading
creates the positive externality of efficient pricing that in turn improves
corporate governance. In effect, informed trading creates a positive
corporate-governance externality. Other investors reap the benefit of
informed trading and pay for it through litigation-based transfers in the
form of damage awards.
Fox and Mitchell usefully cast securities regulation within the
framework of corporate-governance regulation. With the deretailization
of the securities markets, governance concerns, such as agency costs,
offer a more compelling justification for mandatory disclosure than

10.

Mitchell, supra note 7, at 287–90.
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investor protection.11 Under this framework, however, compensation is
a critical component of enforcing mandatory-disclosure obligations
through securities-fraud liability. This Paper argues that the governance
framework provides an important justification for retaining the
compensation objective in private securities-fraud litigation rather than
jettisoning compensation in favor of focusing exclusively on deterrence.
This Paper proceeds as follows. First, the Paper briefly describes
the critiques of private securities-fraud litigation. Second, the Paper
identifies and analyzes the key insight of both papers: reformulating the
goal of federal securities-fraud litigation in terms of a corporategovernance rationale rather than traditional investor protection. Finally,
the Paper extends Professor Fox’s and Professor Mitchell’s analyses to
identify a new defense of private litigation in terms of victim
compensation—a defense that addresses the circularity problem.
I. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE CRITIQUES
As both Fox and Mitchell explain, private securities litigation is
typically described as serving two goals: compensation and
deterrence.12 A damage remedy compensates investors for losses
suffered when those investors are misled in connection with purchasing
or selling securities. Arguably, investors are damaged both by the
decline in the value of their investment and by the impairment of their
investment decision.13 By causing defendants to pay for the costs of the
harm caused by their actions, a damage award also deters wrongdoing.
Corporate decision makers who anticipate bearing the costs of securities
fraud will, ex ante, internalize those costs and engage in efficient levels
of care to ensure that their disclosures are accurate.

11.
See, e.g., Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, The Future of
Securities Regulation, Speech at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute
for Law and Economics (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/
2007/spch102407bgc.htm (describing a reduction in the percentage of retail investors
and exclusion of retail investors from some markets and asset classes as
“deretailization”); see also Donald Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, U. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(questioning whether increased institutionalization creates tension for the Commission’s
traditional approach to retail-investor protection).
12.
See Fox, supra note 6, at 302 (identifying a compensation rationale, but
describing it as “weak” and rejecting it in favor of a deterrence rationale); Mitchell,
supra note 7, at 246 (describing “deterring managerial misconduct” as “a major
purpose of class-action lawsuits”).
13.
See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities
Fraud, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (identifying impairment of the investment
decision as a distinct component of the fraud victim’s harm).
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In recent years, commentators have attacked both justifications.
The central basis for this attack is the observation that, in reality,
virtually all securities-fraud litigation is resolved by settlement. The
settlements are paid by the issuer, usually through a combination of
direct issuer payments and directors and officers (D&O) liability
insurance.14 The costs of the settlement are thus borne by the issuer’s
shareholders. Settlements rarely require individual corporate officials to
pay damages, in part because it is more difficult to establish elements of
the claim (such as scienter) against individual wrongdoers, and also
because of the dynamics of the settlement process. In particular,
plaintiffs may risk losing access to the issuer’s insurance if their
vigorous litigation provides a basis for the insurer to invoke the fraud
exclusion of the D&O policy.15
The settlement of securities-fraud litigation through issuer-funded
damage payments is the basis for the harshest criticism of the
compensation objective: the circularity problem.16 Because issuers are
the ones who pay damages, directly or through insurance, the cost of
the award is borne by current shareholders. A diversified investor is,
on average, as likely to be on the paying end as on the receiving end
and, over time, the sum of the damage awards paid and received should
be a wash. For diversified investors, and the investor body as a whole
then, litigation is largely a zero-sum game, net of transaction costs.
These transaction costs are, however, substantial.17

14.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 1550–54 (citing statistics showing that,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, “the corporate defendant and its insurer
typically advance the entire settlement amount”).
15.
See, e.g., STEPHANIE PLANCICH ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, 2008
TRENDS: SUBPRIME AND AUCTION-RATE CASES CONTINUE TO DRIVE FILINGS, AND
LARGE SETTLEMENTS KEEP AVERAGES HIGH 14 (July 29, 2008), available at
http://www.nera.com/image/BRO_Recent_Trends_8.5x11_0808.pdf (explaining that
settlements are typically covered by D&O insurance, but that an adverse trial judgment
may result in an insurer invoking the fraud exclusion of the policy).
16.
Critics also argue that investors’ losses are largely uncompensated because
securities-fraud cases settle for a very small percentage of the claimed damages. See,
e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 1545 (stating that the ratio of settlements to investor
losses has never exceeded 7.2 percent). This claim ignores the potentially large
differential between claimed damages and recoverable damages, a differential that may
have increased in light of decisions like Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342–43 (2005), that have questioned the extent of the economic loss for which the
defendants are legally responsible. See Fisch, supra note 13 (discussing Dura and its
implications for the methodology of defining the harm effected by securities fraud).
17.
See ANJAN V. THAKOR, THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES
LITIGATION 4–6 (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/
issues.php?option=com_ilr_docs&issue_code=SLI&doc_type=STU (describing the
costs of securities litigation, including decreases in issuer market capitalization and
plaintiffs’ attorneys fees).
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In light of these objections, commentators have turned to
deterrence as an alternative justification for private litigation.18
Deterrence has its critics as well, however. In particular, commentators
observe that securities litigation does not deter individual wrongdoers
because they do not pay damages. The corporate issuers that pay have
not benefited from the fraud (unless they are issuing securities), and
may often be victims themselves to the extent that disclosure violations,
like financial-reporting manipulations, improperly increase management
compensation or reduce the effectiveness of board and capital-market
monitoring.19 Excessive liability exposure and the resulting pressure to
settle weak cases, as well as the risk that hindsight bias will lead to the
erroneous imposition of liability, further reduce the deterrent effect of
litigation because liability exposure that is not closely tied to the costs
of the misconduct will not result in efficient levels of care by corporate
decision makers.20
These concerns have led to suggestions for reevaluating the
existing litigation structure. At the invitation of the United States
Chamber of Commerce, Professor Fox and I, together with other
securities-law professors with diverse perspectives about the value of
private litigation, participated in a series of discussions about the
current litigation system and the potential need for reform. As a result
of these discussions, several members of the group wrote a letter urging
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Christopher Cox
to convene a series of roundtables to gather additional information
about the efficacy of private litigation.21 As articulated in this letter
(which I signed, but Professor Fox did not), the current litigation
system results in “an immense amount of ‘pocket-shifting’ . . . . at a
relatively high cost” and “does a bad job at deterrence.”22

18.
See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 929–
30 (1999) (arguing that deterrence rather than compensation should be the primary goal
in securities-fraud litigation).
19.
Indeed, in other work Professor Fox argues that issuers not making a
public offering of securities should not face civil damage liability; such liability should
be reserved for individual wrongdoers and third-party actors, such as investment banks.
See Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
20.
Fisch, supra note 13.
21.
Letter from Six Law Professors to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC
(Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Law Professor Letter], available at http://www.the10b5daily.com/archives/Chairman%20Cox%20SEC%20Letter.pdf;
see
also
Jesse
Westbrook, SEC to Examine Effect of Investor Lawsuits on U.S. Competitiveness,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 24, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/
09/23/bloomberg/bxinvest.php (describing the letter).
22.
Law Professor Letter, supra note 21.
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II. SECURITIES REGULATION AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Fox and Mitchell address the criticisms about private litigation by
reforming its objectives. Critical to both papers is a corporategovernance rationale for securities regulation. Rather than characterize
the goal of the federal securities regulation as the protection of
investors and the trading markets, Fox and Mitchell argue that
securities regulation can better be understood as a mechanism for
reducing managerial agency costs by enhancing shareholder
monitoring. In effect, the authors envision modern securities regulation
as a backdoor federalization of state corporation law.23
The Fox and Mitchell papers differ in their view of the relationship
between securities regulation and shareholder monitoring. Mitchell
emphasizes the key role of the shareholder in effective corporate
governance. As Mitchell explains, shareholders are ultimately
responsible for corporate decisions through their election of the board
of directors.24 Because of this responsibility, shareholders cannot fairly
be characterized as innocent victims when their agents engage in fraud.
Mitchell observes that, historically, corporate (enterprise) liability
served as a vehicle for ensuring that shareholders, as well as corporate
officials, bore collective responsibility for corporate actions.25 Modern
developments, including the institutionalization of the U.S. equity
markets, coupled with growing sophistication and activism on the part
of institutional investors, have increased the ability of shareholders to
serve as effective monitors.26

23.
Congress rejected the explicit adoption of a federal corporation law when
it adopted the federal securities law. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 208–10 (1982) (describing the consideration of a federal
corporation law); Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy
Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1180–83 (1993) (describing reasons why
Congress did not federalize corporate law). Nonetheless, as some authors have
observed, federal securities litigation has largely supplanted state law as a mechanism
for enforcing some traditional corporate-law principles such as fiduciary duties. See
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003).
24.
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 290.
25.
Indeed, a few vestiges of this responsibility remain. The New York
Business Corporation Law, for example, imposes personal liability on the ten largest
shareholders of a corporation for unpaid wages. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630(a)
(2003). The provision does not apply to publicly traded corporations. Id.
26.
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 830–49 (1992) (describing the
potential for increased monitoring by institutional investors). But see Jill E. Fisch,
Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1025
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Potential securities-fraud liability creates an additional incentive
for shareholders to pay attention to the actions of their corporate
agents. By requiring shareholders to pay when corporate officials
commit fraud, private litigation enhances shareholder responsibility for
the actions of those officials. As Mitchell argues, shareholders
themselves “have the power and thus the responsibility to protect the
integrity of our financial markets through their voting and trading.”27
There are some difficulties with Mitchell’s analysis. Under current
law and practice, shareholders have little power to control the
composition of the board of directors.28 The federal proxy rules do not
allow shareholders to nominate directors directly without mounting an
independent proxy contest, and recent amendments to the federal proxy
rules limit shareholder ability to introduce issuer-specific bylaw
amendments aimed at increasing shareholder nomination power.29 Many
corporations have charter and bylaw provisions such as advance-notice
requirements that further limit shareholder voting rights, as well as
provisions that limit shareholder removal of directors.30 Even with the
widespread adoption of majority-voting provisions, shareholder election
of directors is more accurately understood as the power to ratify a slate
of directors chosen by the current board rather than the power of
selection.31
More troubling is the fact that, even at its best, the power to elect
the board of directors is an attenuated way to exercise control over
corporate management. Under state law, director authority to manage
the corporation is extremely broad. Shareholders have little or no right
to make operational decisions or to take measures that limit the board’s
discretionary authority.32 Indeed, some commentators have argued that,
under Delaware law, a shareholder-initiated bylaw to limit or prohibit

(1994) (questioning whether institutional investors have the appropriate incentives to
engage in activism).
27.
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 292.
28.
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN
CORPORATE LAW 46, 63–67 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) (describing shareholders’
limited power to nominate directors).
29.
Id. at 67.
30.
See, e.g., JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d
335, 344 (Del. Ch. 2008) (describing courts’ experience with advance-notice bylaws),
aff’d sub nom., CNET Networks, Inc. v. Jana Master Fund, Ltd., 947 A.2d 1120 (Del.
2008).
31.
See Fisch, supra note 28, at 69–70 (describing majority-voting
provisions).
32.
The classic case setting forth this principle, which corporations casebooks
continue to include, is Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86
(1880) (rejecting a shareholder attempt to interfere with director decision making).
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the board from adopting a poison pill would be invalid as an
interference with the board’s statutory authority.33
Moreover, although the board of directors technically exercises
supervisory authority over corporate management, in practice the
balance of power often tilts in the other direction. This is evidenced in
the recent debate over excessive executive compensation.34 Despite the
board’s statutory authority to determine executive compensation and the
creation of processes, such as compensation committees, that are
designed to facilitate the independent exercise of that authority, pay
levels suggest that corporate executives continue to enjoy greater
bargaining power than the board.35 Concededly, the increased
importance and independence of audit committees have increased board
oversight of financial reporting, but ultimately boards are poorly
positioned to supervise corporate disclosures in a detailed manner.36
Fox’s paper goes further in developing the role of securities
regulation in reducing managerial agency costs. Fox argues that the
core component of federal securities regulation—mandatory issuer
disclosure—can properly be understood as a corporate-governance
mechanism designed to enhance operational decision making through
increased transparency.37 In addition to increasing the allocational

33.
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and
Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 419
(1998) (“[S]tatutes creating general authority to adopt by-laws may not be construed to
permit stockholders to adopt by-laws directly limiting the managerial power of the
board of directors.”).
34.
See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)
(criticizing structure and amount of executive compensation); Stephen Labaton, Four
Years Later, Enron’s Shadow Lingers as Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2006, at C2 (observing that, despite criticisms and reform proposals, executive
compensation is poorly linked to performance).
35.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 34, at 121.
36.
See, e.g., Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Breaking the Circle: The Problem of

Independent Directors Policing Public Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC’s
New Rules Governing Public Company Audit Committees, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 673, 717 (2004) (observing that, despite the new rules, including SarbanesOxley, “[a]udit committees will still lack sufficient means to adequately look over
management’s shoulder”).
37.
In other work, Professor Fox has described the governance effects of
mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate
Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 114 (1999). He has also identified
reasons why it may be necessary to mandate disclosure beyond the level voluntarily
provided by issuers. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1394–95 (1999). These reasons include the positive externality of improved share-price
accuracy. Mandated disclosure also enhances the ability of the issuer and its managers
to credibly commit to continued transparency.
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efficiency of the capital markets, Fox explains that transparency
improves the functioning of existing corporate-governance structures by
enabling shareholder monitoring devices, such as voting and derivative
litigation, to operate more effectively.38 Similarly, disclosure
requirements applicable to transactions involving a possible conflict of
interest reduce the likelihood of self-dealing by making it easier to
detect.
Professor Jeffrey Gordon’s recent insights into independent
directors complement and extend Fox’s analysis.39 Gordon claims that
transparent financial markets have facilitated the growth of the
independent board because they facilitate monitoring by outside
directors. According to Gordon, outside directors receive critical
information on managerial decisions through stock prices and related
sources of public market information, such as analyst and media
reports; this information allows the directors to monitor effectively,
despite the time and information constraints associated with their
positions.40
The value of transparency in enhancing corporate governance goes
further. Accurate share prices enable performance-based compensation
structures to provide more precise incentives. They ensure that share
buybacks and repurchases do not unfairly discriminate among
shareholders, and that option grants do not dilute existing ownership
interests. Finally, accurate share prices facilitate discipline through the
takeover market.
The key step in Fox’s analysis is his identification of this
governance rationale for regulation, a rationale that extends beyond
investor decisions to trade—which play a role in allocational
efficiency—to the mechanisms that govern internal operational
decisions. Under his view, transparency does not merely improve
investor ability to choose among competing investment opportunities, it
increases the likelihood that those opportunities will be profitable.
Importantly, this governance externality extends beyond secondarymarket trading.
Fox thus transforms securities regulation from public law into
private law,41 viewing disclosure provisions as the efficient terms to
Fox, supra note 6, at 114.
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
38.
39.

1465, 1541 (2007) (“[T]he rise of independent directors is partly explained by the
increasing informativeness of stock prices over the 1950–2005 period.”).
40.
Id. at 1561–62.
41.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public LawPrivate Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 267–72 (1986) (explaining
the distinction between public law and private law); Amir N. Licht, International
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which investors and issuers would have voluntarily agreed in the
absence of limitations in the contracting process. In this world, civil
enforcement is analogous to the standard private right of action for
breach of contract. Private civil enforcement is therefore the norm,
rather than the exception. When they bring a claim, securities-fraud
plaintiffs are not acting as private attorney generals enforcing an
obligation to the general public, they are enforcing a disclosure
obligation that is personal to them. According to Fox, public
enforcement, rather than private, is the phenomenon that requires
justification.42
Fox’s analysis provides a fit between the disclosure components of
securities regulation and those aspects of federal law that intrude more
explicitly into corporate governance—the SEC’s extensive regulation of
shareholder voting under the federal proxy rules;43 the board
composition and committee requirements adopted by the self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), at the behest of the SEC;44 and the short-swing
trading restrictions of section 16(b), which Professor Steve Thel
demonstrates are more properly viewed as restraints on management
manipulation of operational decisions than restrictions on the use of
nonpublic information.45 Fox’s explanation also fits nicely with the
evolution of private securities-fraud litigation. It is consistent with
Professors Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale’s assessment that
securities-fraud litigation has served to federalize state-law fiduciary
principles, enabling shareholders to expand a traditional governance
claim beyond the existing limits of state law.46 It even offers a plausible
rationale for the Supreme Court of the United States’s recent decision
in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.47 to
limit the scope of fraud claims against nonissuer defendants; such
claims could not be predicated upon the implicit contractual disclosure

Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 258 (1998) (explaining that, although the borders are not clear,
the “public law/private law distinction between securities regulation and corporate law
generally holds”).
42.
See Fox, supra note 6, at 132 (“Public enforcement is only needed when
there is some kind of enforcement-market failure.”).
43.
See Fisch, supra note 28, at 46–47.
44.
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal

Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of
Directors, 53 DUKE. L.J. 517, 553–55 (2003) (describing the New York Stock
Exchange and Nasdaq adoption of rules governing independent audit committees).
45.
Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of
Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 393 (1991).
See Thompson & Sale, supra note 23.
46.
47.
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
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obligation and might require the more traditional common-law
predicates.
Perhaps the most challenging part of Fox’s analysis lies in the
structure of the private enforcement mechanism. Current law denies
standing to shareholders who have not traded48—those shareholders
who, under Fox’s view, are the true victims of the fraud by being
deprived of information that would have enabled them to monitor
and/or discipline management. More significantly, those holders will
wind up paying damages. Private securities-fraud litigation instead
consists of contractual-disclosure claims that are enforced by traders for
the benefit of, but at the cost of, current holders. There is little reason
to believe that the social cost of the harm to current holders—the impact
of the fraud on the operation of the firm’s governance structure—is
correlated with the recoverable damages, defined as the effect of the
revelation of the fraud upon market prices. More problematically, the
interests of traders, many of whom are no longer shareholders, need
not be aligned with the interests of current holders. This agency
problem is magnified by the class-action mechanism, which places a
premium upon factors such as the issuer’s market capitalization, trading
volume, and insurance coverage, because of the significance of those
factors in increasing the predicted fee award available to plaintiffs’
counsel.
Another challenge for the corporate-governance rationale is the
mandatory nature of the enforcement remedy. Commentators have
suggested that shareholders should be able to modify the privatelitigation remedy or choose an alternative enforcement mechanism,
such as arbitration, on an issuer-specific basis,49 but this suggestion is
complicated by the fact that current shareholders, in adopting such a
provision, would be limiting the rights of future shareholders.50

48.
(1975).
49.

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 725, 754–55

See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919,

954 (1988) (“Arguably, both the derivative action and some actions based on Rule 10b5 could be either preempted or precluded by an agreement to arbitrate set forth in the
corporation’s certificate of incorporation and, in theory, accepted by shareholders when
they acquired their shares.”); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373,
424 (2005) (arguing that companies could opt out of securities class-action lawsuits
through collective-action waivers); A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 248 (suggesting that shareholders could modify the
damage remedy in an SEC Rule 10b-5 claim through an appropriate charter provision).
50.
See REPORT OF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS ON CLASS ACTION REFORM AT
DUKE UNIVERSITY 13 (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://ilep.info/pdf/Roundtable_
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Although one might argue that shareholders implicitly accept the terms
of the corporate charter—including a waiver of litigation rights—when
they purchase stock, this argument is weakened if the interests of
current shareholders are directly adverse to those of future
shareholders. Because Fox’s argument conceptualizes private litigation
in terms of protecting the interests of current shareholders, it
strengthens the argument that, like other governance provisions, it
should be subject to modification by those shareholders.51
A final concern is the calculation of damages. Fox acknowledges
that current damage analysis does not capture the extent of governance
harm caused by securities fraud, creating the risk of a mismatch
between the private and social value of litigation.52 A complete analysis
of this problem is beyond the scope of this Paper, but Fox elsewhere
addresses the challenge of designing a system of civil liability in which
damages are tied more closely to social harm.53
III. USING THE GOVERNANCE STORY TO REINSTATE THE
COMPENSATION OBJECTIVE

A. The Corporate-Governance Response to Circularity
Mitchell and Fox offer persuasive reasons to reconceptualize
private securities litigation as a corporate-governance mechanism. Their
arguments can, however, be extended to provide a broader response to
the critics of private litigation. In addition to providing a deterrencebased rationale for securities-fraud litigation, the corporate-governance
rationale adds a new justification for compensation, and, at the same
time, offers an answer to the circularity problem.
The role of informed traders in promoting capital-market
efficiency is the key to this solution. If securities regulation is about
increasing issuer transparency to improve corporate governance, then
effective securities regulation requires not just ex post enforcement of
disclosure violations, but ex ante incorporation of mandated disclosure
into the securities markets. Transparency alone is not enough to
improve corporate governance. For shareholders and directors to use
200702_Final_Report.pdf (identifying the question of whether such provisions would be
enforceable against newly purchasing shareholders); Gilles, supra note 49, at 423–25
(noting concern about the enforceability of unilaterally adopted waivers against
strangers who purchase on the secondary market).
51.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1989) (summarizing the literature
arguing “that corporations should largely be free to opt out of corporate law rules”).
52.
Fox, supra note 6, at 123.
53.
Fox, supra note 19.
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the disclosed information to monitor, it must be incorporated into
equity prices. For securities that are traded in efficient markets, this
incorporation occurs through informed secondary trading. Informed
traders must research and analyze firm-specific information, use that
information to adjust their expectations about firm value, and act on
that information by trading.
The theory behind the circularity argument is that the market
consists primarily of diversified investors for whom the gains and
losses from securities fraud net out.54 The objective of diversification is
to achieve a market rate of return by eliminating firm-specific risk.55
Because a diversified portfolio largely eliminates firm-specific rewards
as well, it reduces the incentive for investors to engage in costly
information gathering. At the extreme, for the indexed investor, whose
investments are completely independent of firm-specific information,
the cost of research is wholly irrational.56
Passive diversified investing may be a rational strategy for a
particular investor, but this strategy is devastating for the market as a
whole. Investors will not acquire information unless they have the
opportunity to profit on that information by trading. More specifically,
for an investor to benefit from firm-specific research, the potential
profit from that research must exceed the costs of research and
analysis.57 Thus, informed trading requires investors to limit their
diversification and concentrate their holdings in a limited number of

54.
Coffee, supra note 4, at 1558 (“[A]t least in the aggregate, diversified
investors are largely making wealth transfers among themselves as the result of
contemporary securities litigation.”).
55.
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and
Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
909, 936 (1994) (explaining that investors can eliminate firm-specific risk through
diversification).
56.
See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing
Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 811, 836 (2003) (explaining that indexing “eliminates the need for
expensive research on individual corporations”).
57.
Although one might argue that, with mandated disclosure, the cost of
acquiring firm-specific information is very low, the analysis of that information is more
costly. Moreover, such analysis is fundamental to the corporate-governance story. For
stock prices to facilitate monitoring through the mechanisms described above, they must
be efficient, not merely in an information sense, but in terms of fundamental value—
that is, information must be incorporated into stock prices properly. See, e.g., Jill E.
Fisch, Picking A Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 464 (1995) (reviewing ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)) (explaining the
difference between informational efficiency and fundamental-value efficiency). But see
Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (citing evidence that the markets are not
fundamentally efficient).
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issuers.58 Indexed investors, in contrast, seriously threaten market
efficiency.
As a result, informed traders are a critical component of the
market that enables mandated disclosure to serve as a corporategovernance mechanism. Yet, informed traders incur costs that are not
borne by other investors. They incur the costs of research.59 They incur
the reduced liquidity and increased risk associated with limiting their
diversification.60 And they incur, disproportionately, the costs of
securities fraud because, relying on firm-specific disclosure to trade,
they are more likely than diversified investors to be net losers.
Informed traders are more likely to suffer net losses from
securities fraud precisely because they trade on information, including
fraudulent information. For example, when an issuer releases false
information about the United States Food and Drug Administration
testing of its new pharmaceutical product, informed traders are likely to
buy. Uninformed traders, lacking that information, are more likely to
be on the opposite side of those trades. Indeed, when the price
increases as a result of the fraud, some uninformed traders, such as
index funds, are particularly likely to sell because the price increase
triggers the need to rebalance their portfolios.61
The governance rationale therefore suggests that compensation is
both desirable and noncircular. For informed traders, the gains and
losses from securities fraud are unlikely to net out. Even if they did,
informed traders incur disproportionate costs because of their trading
activity. Rather than viewing these costs as an indication that informed
traders have failed to diversify sufficiently, policy makers should
recognize that the costs produce a positive governance externality. If

58.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069–70 (2007)
(explaining that a shareholder-activism strategy is feasible for hedge funds that take
concentrated stakes in portfolio companies but not for diversified institutional
investors).
59.
It is a separate issue whether informed traders incur excessive information
costs, either individually or collectively. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to
Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113
YALE L.J. 269, 290–91 (2003) (considering the possibility that investors engage in
excessive research).
60.
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520, 568 (1990) (“Large stakes reduce liquidity . . . .”).
61.
See, e.g., Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake, Intermediaries’ or
Investors’: Whose Market is it Anyway?, 19 J. CORP. L. 443, 458 (1994) (“Those who
index do not buy or sell on news. Instead, they execute transactions to invest newlyreceived funds, to rebalance their portfolio keeping it closely weighted to track the
particular index being followed, or to make changes in asset allocation formulas
. . . .”).
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fraud increases the cost of providing this externality, holders should
compensate traders for the resulting losses.
Significantly, the compensation justification addresses one of the
difficulties posed by Fox’s analysis—the mismatch between the damage
calculation and the social harm caused by the fraud. The informedtrader analysis demonstrates that securities fraud does not simply harm
society through a loss of efficiency, but harms the specific traders
whose reliance-based investment decisions have been distorted. To the
extent that damages compensate traders for this harm, the traditional
calculation of damages based on trading volume and price distortions is
reasonably well correlated with that harm.

B. Possible Objections to the Governance Story
The governance story is not immune from criticism. Perhaps the
greatest concern is that a system that requires passive investors, like
pension funds, to compensate informed traders, such as hedge funds, is
unlikely to be well received by the public. This rationale for
compensation is quite different from the justification of protecting
small, unsophisticated retail investors—widowers and orphans. Even if
retail investors—who are disproportionately holders—ultimately benefit
from a system of securities regulation that improves corporate
governance, their benefits are less visible and less easily quantifiable
than the losses they bear through damage awards.
More problematic is the lack of fit between the governance
analysis and the existing structure of securities-fraud litigation—
specifically, the Basic Inc. v. Levinson 62 fraud-on-the-market classaction lawsuit. I have laid out a justification for compensating informed
traders because their reliance-based investment strategy provides a
corporate-governance externality. Fraud-on-the-market cases, on the
other hand, compensate investors without regard to their individualized
reliance. Thus, under my reasoning, such class-action lawsuits
substantially overcompensate a large class of investors. At the same
time, because the damage award is shared among the entire trading
class, informed traders are likely to be undercompensated in the sense
that they recover merely a fraction of their actual losses.
Accordingly, one possible implication of the governance story
suggests that Basic should be cut back. The Basic decision has, of
course, been subject to criticism,63 and, although I have questioned the
62.
63.

485 U.S. 224 (1988).

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics:
Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV.
1017 (1991).
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rationale of Basic elsewhere,64 an extensive analysis of the case is
beyond the scope of this Paper.65 This Paper, however, supports a
reformulation of Basic, rather than a reversal. In particular, the
Supreme Court could expand reliance to include those who acquire
information from market intermediaries, such as analysts and the news
media, while rejecting a cause of action for investors who relied solely
on the market price.66 A broader conception of reliance would more
accurately reflect the information environment in which investors trade
while retaining the critical causal link between the fraud and the trading
decision.
A final concern is the extent to which the agency costs of
institutional investors interfere with the theoretical operation of the
informed trading model. The institutionalization of the securities
markets has led to a system in which individual portfolio managers
make trading decisions on behalf of their institutional employers, yet
those portfolio managers may be compensated in ways that distort their
incentives, creating problems such as short-term bias, herding, and
excessive risk taking.67 Any such distortion will disrupt market
efficiency, in a fundamental sense, and reduce capital-market
discipline.
CONCLUSION
The extensive criticisms of private securities-fraud litigation
warrant a careful reexamination of the pros and cons of the existing
structure. Fox and Mitchell respond to these criticisms by focusing on
the deterrence objective. Both authors ground their analysis in a
broader conception of deterrence, in which securities regulation
improves the corporate governance of public issuers by enabling
shareholders, outside directors and the capital markets to monitor
64.
See generally Fisch, supra note 13.
65.
For a more extensive analysis of Basic and its legacy, see Donald
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151.
66.
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 13 (arguing that Basic could have extended
reliance, consistent with common-law fraud principles, to incorporate investors who
relied on third-party intermediaries who were themselves defrauded). Information flow
in today’s markets suggests that such intermediaries play a critical role in informing
investors. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005)
(involving significant stock-price reaction to a Wall Street Journal analysis of the
issuer’s disclosure, despite absence of a reaction to the prior securities filing containing
that information).
67.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1326–27 (1991) (describing
regulatory restrictions on investment-adviser compensation and resulting incentive
problems).
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corporate decision making. Under this model, protection of
shareholders, rather than investors, is a primary goal of securities
regulation.
Yet, the corporate-governance model requires more than
disclosure; it requires market participants to acquire, evaluate and use
the information disclosed by issuers. As such, the model identifies a
key role for informed traders who, through their market behavior,
incorporate information into securities prices. This process produces a
corporate-governance externality that inures to the benefit of nontrading
shareholders. Both the value of this externality and the costs borne by
informed traders in producing it offer a rationale for compensating
informed traders for their fraud-based losses. Ultimately, the
governance story has more powerful implications than those articulated
by Fox and Mitchell, because in addition to its import for deterrence, it
provides a compelling answer to the circularity problem.

